Fraud Solicitors
The law on fraud has been changed in recent years. The Fraud Act 2006 covers deception and other offences of dishonesty. The law is complex but the detailed summary of the new law is in understandable language.
Fraud Act 2006
Section 1 | Fraud
(1) A person is guilty of fraud if he is in breach of any of the sections listed in subsection (2) (which provide for different ways of committing the offence).
(2) The sections are -
(a) section 2 (fraud by false representation),
(b) section 3 (fraud by failing to disclose information), and
(c) section 4 (fraud by abuse of position).
(3) A person who is guilty of fraud is liable -
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or to both);
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years or to a fine (or to both).
2 | Fraud by false representation
(1) A person is in breach of this section if he -
(a) dishonestly makes a false representation, and
(b) intends, by making the representation -
(i) to make a gain for himself or another, or
(ii) to cause loss to another or to expose another to a risk of loss.
(2) A representation is false if -
(a) it is untrue or misleading, and
(b) the person making it knows that it is, or might be, untrue or misleading.
(3) "Representation" means any representation as to fact or law, including a representation as to the state of mind of -
(a)the person making the representation, or
(b) any other person.
(4) A representation may be express or implied.
(5) For the purposes of this section a representation may be regarded as made if it (or anything implying it) is submitted in any form to any system or device designed to receive, convey or respond to communications (with or without human intervention).
Section 3 | Fraud by failing to disclose information
A person is in breach of this section if he -
(a) dishonestly fails to disclose to another person information which he is under a legal duty to disclose, and
(b) intends, by failing to disclose the information -
(i) to make a gain for himself or another, or
(ii) to cause loss to another or to expose another to a risk of loss.
Section 4 | Fraud by abuse of position
(1) A person is in breach of this section if he -
(a) occupies a position in which he is expected to safeguard, or not to act against, the financial interests of another person,
(b) dishonestly abuses that position, and
(c) intends, by means of the abuse of that position -
(i) to make a gain for himself or another, or
(ii) to cause loss to another or to expose another to a risk of loss.
(2) A person may be regarded as having abused his position even though his conduct consisted of an omission rather than an act.
Section 5 | "Gain" and "loss"
(1) The references to gain and loss in sections 2 to 4 are to be read in accordance with this section.
(2) "Gain" and "loss" -
(a) extend only to gain or loss in money or other property;
(b) include any such gain or loss whether temporary or permanent; and "property" means any property whether real or personal (including things in action and other intangible property).
(3) "Gain" includes a gain by keeping what one has, as well as a gain by getting what one does not have.
(4) "Loss" includes a loss by not getting what one might get, as well as a loss by parting with what one has.
The elements of the offence
(a) General
Dishonesty
All three ways of committing the offence of fraud require dishonesty. The Act contains no definition or qualification of the meaning of dishonesty; in particular, there is no reference to the provisions of the Theft Act 1968, and no express defence of a claim of right. The explanatory notes to the Act make it clear that it was envisaged that the test in R. v. Ghosh (Deb Baran)[1982] Q.B. 1053,75 Cr.App.R. 154, CA, would apply.
In R. v. Ghosh (Deb Baran) (at pp.1060, 159) Lord Lane C.J. said, in respect of the now repealed offence of obtaining by deception, contrary to section 15 of the Theft Act 1968: "The difficulty ... is that dishonesty comes in twice. If a person knows that he is not telling the truth he is guilty of dishonesty. Indeed deliberate deception is one of the two most obvious forms of dishonesty. One wonders therefore whether 'dishonestly' in section 15(1) adds anything, except in the case of reckless deception." The element of dishonesty is likely, however, to be of considerably more significance under the Fraud Act, since, for example, the offence of fraud by false representation can be committed with knowledge merely that the representation might be untrue or misleading, and the other two methods of committing the offence can each be committed by omission.
Intention to make a gain or to cause a loss
The definitions of "gain" and "loss" in section 5 follow those in the Theft Act 1968, s.34(2), and thus authorities considering the latter section are equally applicable to offences of fraud. However, the application of the definition in the Fraud Act differs in two respects:
(i) in respect of "gain", the offence of fraud requires an intent, by means of the actus reus, "to make a gain", rather than the lesser requirement of acting "with a view to gain" in the Theft Act 1968, ss.17, 20 and 21; as a result, although none of the three ways of committing fraud has to be effective, each has to be intended to be; but
(ii) in respect of "loss", the necessary intent is less restrictive than under the Theft Act 1968, since it includes an intent merely to expose another to a risk of loss.
"Gain" and "loss" extend only to gain or loss in money or other property; "property" includes things in action. Relevant things in action, which might represent a gain, could arise from money transfers (covering the earlier offence under the Theft Act 1968, s.15A), or where a person is tricked into incurring a liability, such as under a contract or a guarantee.
"Gain" does not mean profit; there can be a gain where a person obtains money to which he is entitled (Att.-Gen.'s Reference (No. 1 of 2001)[2002] 3 All E.R. 840, CA, and thus a person who uses a false representation to trick a debtor into paying money which he is owed will commit the offence if he acts dishonestly.
An intention permanently to deprive is not an element of fraud, since the intended gain or loss can be temporary or permanent; where property is gained which will later be returned to its owner (such as a voucher, bill of exchange, or cheque), the question of whether by then it will have lost its value (cf. the Theft Act 1968, s.6, ante, 21-76) does not arise.
Inducing a creditor to forbear from suing on a debt is not a "gain": R. v. Goleccha and Choraria,90 Cr.App.R. 241, CA, consequently not all conduct previously caught by the offence of evading liability by deception (contrary to the Theft Act 1978, s.2 will constitute an offence under the Fraud Act.
Offences by companies
Where the "person" in breach of sections 2 to 4 is a body corporate, those involved in its management who have consented to or connived in the offence are also guilty of it by virtue of section 12 of the Act.
(b) Fraud by false representation
Making a representation which is untrue or misleading
The offence is committed when the representation is made; it is not dependent on a result being achieved. The representation can be made to a machine (s.2 (5), but is only so made when "submitted"; by analogy, it is submitted that a representation to a person is only made when transmitted, so that a representation made by email will not be made until the email is sent.
The representation must be untrue or misleading (s.2 (2), ante). There is no express requirement of materiality in the respect in which it is untrue or misleading, either objectively or subjectively to the defendant. Thus a person who, intending to make a gain, knowingly makes a representation which is only peripherally false or misleading will be caught if and only if he is dishonest.
The representation may be as to fact or law, and includes a representation as to the state of mind of the person making the representation (such as his present intention) (s.2 (3), ante). It is submitted that, as under the earlier legislation, "fact" means existing fact and does not extend to predictions as to the future.
Knowledge that the representation is or might be untrue or misleading
The definition of "false" incorporates the requirement that the person making the representation knows that the representation is, or might be, untrue or misleading. Whilst knowledge is a stricter requirement than suspicion, a person may know that a representation might be untrue without suspecting that it is - such as a defendant who has no idea one way or the other whether the representation he is making is true.
The question of whether the defendant knew that the representation was or might be untrue or misleading is separate from the additional and essential requirement that the false representation be made dishonestly; applying the reasoning in R. v. Feeny (Hugh Dennis),94 Cr.App.R. 1, CA (considering reckless deception under the now repealed section 15 of the 1968 Act), it will be particularly important where the allegation is that the defendant knew merely that the representation might be untrue or misleading that there should be no risk that the jury might confuse this state of mind with dishonesty or conclude that dishonesty would inevitably follow.
Payment by a cheque
The representations which may as a matter of law be inferred from the mere act of drawing a cheque are:
(a) that the drawer has an account with the bank upon which the cheque is drawn, and
(b) that the existing state of facts is such that in ordinary course the cheque will be met, i.e. on first presentation (commonly expressed as "that the cheque is a good and valid order for the amount entered"). There is clear judicial authority supporting this as an accurate statement of principle: Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis v. Charles (Derek Michael)[1977] A.C. 177, HL; R. v. Gilmartin (Anthony)[1983] Q.B. 953, 76 Cr.App.R. 238, CA (post, 21-376).
The decision of the Court of Appeal in R. v. Greenstein and Green,61 Cr.App.R. 296, CA, appears to be authority for the proposition that it is open to a court to infer, from the act of drawing a cheque, a representation by the drawer that he is not relying, for the cheque to be met, on funds to be provided by the payee by way of a "return" cheque. The case was concerned with a "stagging" operation in shares: when new shares were issued, the defendants applied for more than they could pay for, knowing that only a small proportion of the shares applied for would be issued to them. The issuing houses required applications to be accompanied by a cheque for the full price of the shares applied for; they would send a "return" cheque for the price of shares not issued to the applicant.
Post-dated cheques
In R. v. Gilmartin (Anthony) ([1983] Q.B. 953), ante, Robert Goff L.J., giving the judgment of the Court of Appeal in a case under the 1968 Act, said that the act of drawing a post-dated cheque generally implies a representation that the drawer is a customer of the bank concerned, and referred to R. v. Maytum-White,42 Cr.App.R. 165, CCA. His Lordship added that that was not the only representation which could be inferred.
"We can see no reason why in the case of a post-dated cheque the drawer does not impliedly represent that the existing facts at the date when he gives the cheque to the payee or his agent are such that in the ordinary course the cheque will, on presentation on or after the date specified in the cheque, be met ... . For the sake of clarity, we consider that in the generality of cases ... , the courts should proceed on the basis that by the simple giving of a cheque, whether post-dated or not, the drawer impliedly represents that the state of facts existing at the date of handing over the cheque is such that in the ordinary course the cheque will, on presentation for payment on or after the date specified in the cheque, be met" (at pp. 961, 245).
Cheque cards
Where the holder of a cheque card presented the card together with a cheque made out in accordance with the conditions of the card, it was open to the court to infer that a representation had been made by the drawer that he had authority as between himself and the bank to use the card in order to oblige the bank to honour the cheque: Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis v. Charles (Derek Michael) ([1977] A.C. 177), ante; but the authority given to the cheque card holder is not unlimited, in that it does not extend to the use of the card to secure acceptance of a cheque which he knows would not be met if the cheque card had not been used: ibid., per Viscount Dilhorne (at p. 186); and per Lord Diplock (at pp.182-183).
Credit cards
In R. v. Lambie (Shiralee Ann)[1982] A.C. 449, HL, the issue was whether the reasoning of the House of Lords in Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis v. Charles (Derek Michael) ([1977] A.C. 177), ante, as to the representations to be inferred from the use of a cheque backed by a cheque card applied to the use of a credit card. It was held that it did, and that where a person presented a credit card in payment for goods or services, that person represented that he had actual authority to make the contract with the supplier on the bank's behalf and that the bank would honour the voucher on presentation.
Withdrawal slips
Where a person withdraws or seeks to withdraw money from a bank account (or building society account) the presentation of the withdrawal slip is a representation that the bank is indebted (i.e. lawfully owes) to him in the amount shown: R. v. Harrison,92 Cr.App.R. 54, CA. The facts concerned withdrawals of money from accounts funded by means of forged cheques. No cheques were involved in the obtaining or attempt at obtaining the money.
Quotations
In R. v. Silverman (Michael John),86 Cr.App.R. 213, CA, it was said that it could not be right to say that someone who was asked for a quotation for work or services would inevitably come into conflict with the criminal law if he pitched his quotation very high. Whether or not he had made a false representation that the amount was a fair and reasonable price had to depend upon the particular circumstances. Where there was a relationship of trust between customers and tradesmen, so that the customers relied upon the tradesmen to act fairly and reasonably towards them at all times, a false representation might be made if a grossly excessive price was quoted and charged for work or services, even if, apart from mentioning the price, nothing more was said and no pressure was applied to encourage the acceptance of the quotation.
"Phishing"
The explanatory notes to the Act state that the offence of fraud by false representation would be committed by someone who engaged in "phishing" by disseminating an email to a large group of people falsely representing that it had been sent by a legitimate financial institution and prompting the reader to provide information such as credit card and bank account numbers so that the "phisher" could gain access to others' assets (sed quaere whether the "phisher" would intend, by that representation, to make a gain in money or other property, or whether that intention would instead accompany a subsequent representation made to the financial institution using the information provided).
Representations which were true when first made
In DPP v. Ray[1974] A.C. 370, HL, which concerned the now repealed section 15 of the 1968 Act, Lord Morris said (at p. 386) that a continuing representation which is true initially but subsequently becomes false becomes a deliberate deception. This can only be so under section 2 (text) of the Fraud Act if the representation is made again, expressly or impliedly, once the person making it knows that it has or might have become untrue or misleading. Accepting benefits flowing from a representation after it has ceased to be true may involve an implied representation that it is still true: for an example under the earlier legislation, see R. v. Rai (Thomas)[2000] 1 Cr.App.R. 242, CA (home improvements for the benefit of the defendant's mother, applied for when she was still alive, but accepted after her death).
Where a person is under a legal duty to disclose the fact that the representation has become false, section 3 (text) will apply (post).
(c) Fraud by failing to disclose information
Legal duty to disclose
The defendant must be under a legal duty to disclose the undisclosed information. Examples given in the explanatory notes to the Act are duties of disclosure in applications for insurance, company prospectuses, and as between agent and principal. Section 3 (text)(a), ante, 21-358, does not state expressly that the legal duty must be to disclose to the person to whom the defendant has failed to disclose the information, but it is submitted that this is implicit in the definition of the offence.
There is no requirement that the defendant must know that he is under a legal duty to disclose the information, although his knowledge on this issue will be relevant to dishonesty. On the other hand, he must know that the information is material, for otherwise he could not intend, by failing to disclose the information, to make the gain, etc.
Failure to disclose
The requirements of dishonesty and the necessary intent (ante, 21-369 et seq.) ensure that the failure must be deliberate. The offence will be committed at the point when the defendant first has the necessary mens rea and is under the duty, and will continue so long as both subsist without disclosure being made. A defendant who, upon specific enquiry, provides information which he had been under a legal duty to provide earlier will have committed the offence if he had intended dishonestly to make the gain or cause the loss without the enquiry being made.
(d) Fraud by abuse of position
Position
The offence requires a person to occupy a position in which he is expected to safeguard, or not to act against, the financial interests of another person: s.4 (text)(1)(a), ante, 21-359. The Act does not specify by whose expectation the position is to be judged; it must thus be by the reasonable member of the public as personified by the jury. Examples given in the explanatory notes to the Act include the relationship between trustee and beneficiary, director and company, employee and employer, between partners, and within the family.
A person who did not occupy such a position could nonetheless be guilty of the offence as a secondary party, such as the beneficiary of a dishonestly awarded contract.
Abuse of the position
Abuse is not defined in the Act; it is submitted, however, that it must involve acting contrary to the expectation by which the position is defined (viz. to safeguard, or not to act against, the financial interests of another person) and in a way which is made possible because of the position. Abuse of position will include theft in breach of trust; and the offence can be committed by omission: s.4 (text)(2), ante.
As with the other ways of committing the offence of fraud, the abuse of position need not result in actual gain or loss.
commentary021-387
The abuse must be dishonest and must be accompanied by the requisite intent as to gain and loss There is no express requirement that the defendant must know that he is expected to safeguard or not to act against the financial interests of the other person, or to know that his act (or failure to act) constitutes an abuse of his position. However, he must intend that the act (or failure to act) which constitutes the abuse of the position will make a gain or cause loss, etc., to another (not necessarily the person whose interests he is expected to safeguard).
(6) Jurisdiction
Statute
The offence of fraud is a "Group A" offence within Part 1 of the CJA 1993. Part 1 is set out at 2-37 et seq., ante, where the effect is considered in detail. Jurisdiction is conferred if a "relevant event", defined by section 2 of that Act (text), occurred in England and Wales. In respect of an offence of fraud, relevant events include the occurrence of a gain, if the fraud involved an intention to make that gain, and the occurrence of a loss, if the fraud involved an intention to cause or to expose another to the risk of that loss (see s.2 1A)).
The common law rules governing jurisdiction do not apply to offences of fraud, since any such offence must have been committed after January 15, 2007, and thus after the commencement of Part 1 of the CJA 1993.
Section 6 | Possession etc. of articles for use in frauds
(1) A person is guilty of an offence if he has in his possession or under his control any article for use in the course of or in connection with any fraud.
(2) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable -
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or to both);
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years or to a fine (or to both).
Section 7 | Making or supplying articles for use in frauds
(1) A person is guilty of an offence if he makes, adapts, supplies or offers to supply any article -
(a) knowing that it is designed or adapted for use in the course of or in connection with fraud, or
(b) intending it to be used to commit, or assist in the commission of, fraud.
on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years or to a fine (or to both).
Section 8 | "Article"
(1) For the purposes of -
(a) sections 6 and 7, and
(b) the provisions listed in subsection (2), so far as they relate to articles for use in the course of or in connection with fraud, "article" includes any program or data held in electronic form.
(2) The provisions are -
(a) section 1(7)(b) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984,
(b) section 2(8)(b) of the Armed Forces Act 2001, and
(4) Sentence
For possession of articles for use in frauds, imprisonment not exceeding five years: s.6(2) ; for making or supplying such articles, imprisonment not exceeding 10 years: s.7(2).
Both offences are specified serious offences within Schedule 1 to the SCA 2007, enabling the Crown Court to make a serious crime prevention order under section 19 on conviction .
(5) The elements of the offences
(a) Possession of an article for use in fraud
Prove simply that the defendant had the article in his possession or under his control and that it was an article for use in the course of or in connection with any fraud, i.e. any fraud falling within section 1 of the Act It is submitted that if Parliament had intended to include other fraudulent conduct then language such as that in section 13 ("or a related offence", would have been used. Unlike the offence of going equipped, contrary to section 25 of the Theft Act 1968 ), there is no requirement that the defendant not be at his place of abode.
Article
An article includes any program or data held in electronic form: s.8(1), ante. If such an article were on the defendant's computer completely unbeknown to him, he would not be guilty of the offence, since possession requires some degree of knowledge; and where the file has been deleted, possession also requires the know-how and the software to retrieve it: see Atkins v. DPP;Goodland v. DPP[2000] 2 Cr.App.R. 248, DC, and R. v. Porter (Ross Warwick)[2006] 2 Cr.App.R. 25, CA, respectively
For use in fraud
By analogy with the offence of going equipped to steal (ante, 21-324 et seq.), it is not necessary to prove that the defendant intended the article to be used in the course of or in connection with any specific fraud; it will be enough to prove a general intention that it be so used, whether by himself or by someone else: R. v. Ellames,60 Cr.App.R. 7, CA (for cases on the Theft Act 1968, s.25, ).
(b) Making or supplying an article for use in fraud
Proof that the defendant did one of the four specified acts in relation to the article, viz. making it, adapting it, supplying it or offering to supply it, and that he did so with one of the two specified states of mind, viz. knowing that it was designed (not necessarily by him) or adapted for use in the course of or in connection with fraud, or intending it to be used (not necessarily by him or by the person to whom he supplied it) to commit, or assist in the commission of, fraud.
Knowledge
Proof of knowledge also requires proof that the article was in fact designed or adapted for use in the course of or in connection with fraud (cf. R. v. Montila (Steven William)[2005] 1 Cr.App.R. 26, HL, post, 33-4). As with the offence of possession, this need not be in the course of or in connection with any specific fraud: Ellames ([1974] 1 W.L.R. 1391), ante.
Intent
Where the actus reus is supplying, or offering to supply, and the mens rea is intent rather than knowledge, the article need not be designed or adapted for use in the course of or in connection with fraud. The intention, viz. that it be used to commit, or assist in the commission of, fraud, is differently worded and suggests a closer connection to the commission of a particular, intended, fraud.
(c) Obtaining Services Dishonestly
Section 11 | Obtaining services dishonestly
(1) A person is guilty of an offence under this section if he obtains services for himself or another -
(a) by a dishonest act, and
(b) in breach of subsection (2).
(2) A person obtains services in breach of this subsection if -
(a) they are made available on the basis that payment has been, is being or will be made for or in respect of them,
(b) he obtains them without any payment having been made for or in respect of them or without payment having been made in full, and
(c) when he obtains them, he knows -
(i) that they are being made available on the basis described in paragraph (a), or
(ii) that they might be, but intends that payment will not be made, or will not be made in full.
(3) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable -
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or to both);
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years or to a fine (or to both).
(4) Sentence
Maximum
Imprisonment not exceeding five years:
Financial reporting orders
A financial reporting order may be made in respect of a person convicted of an offence of obtaining services dishonestly: SOCPA 2005, s.76
Serious crime prevention orders
Obtaining services dishonestly is a specified serious offence within Schedule 1 to the SCA 2007, enabling the Crown Court to make a serious crime prevention order under section 19 on conviction.
(5) The elements of the offence
Obtaining services
The services must actually have been obtained; in this respect, the offence differs from the offence of fraud. They must also be services which were made available on the basis that they had been, were being or would be paid for, and for which payment had not been made, or had not been made in full, at the time they were obtained: s.11(2)(a) and (b), ante. Thus a person who dishonestly obtains and pays for services to which he knows he is not entitled does not commit the offence.
Unlike its predecessor, the Act does not define "services"; it is likely that it will embrace at least all those benefits which had been said to fall within the definition which was provided under the Theft Act 1978, s.1, such as a loan, or the provision of banking or credit card services (R. v. Sofroniou (Leon Florenzous)[2004] 1 Cr.App.R. 35, CA), professional, commercial or financial services (R. v. Graham (Hemamali Krishna);R. v. Kansal;R. v. Ali (Sajid);R. v. Marsh[1997] 1 Cr.App.R. 302, CA), or a hire-purchase agreement (R. v. Widdowson,82 Cr.App.R. 314, CA).
Knowledge
The defendant must obtain the services knowing that they are, or might be, being made available on the basis that they had been, were being or would be paid for: s.11(2)(c),
Intent not to pay
The defendant must intend that payment will not be made, or will not be made in full: s.11(2)(c),.
Dishonest act
The services must be obtained by an act (and thus not by omission), and that act must be dishonest; this is in addition to the requirement that they be obtained knowing that payment is or might be required and intending not to pay. The dishonest act could be, but is not limited to, the making of a false representation. As to dishonesty, see, ante, 21-2c.
Section 13 | Evidence
(1) A person is not to be excused from -
(a) answering any question put to him in proceedings relating to property, or
(b) complying with any order made in proceedings relating to property, on the ground that doing so may incriminate him or his spouse or civil partner of an offence under this Act or a related offence.
(2) But, in proceedings for an offence under this Act or a related offence, a statement or admission made by the person in -
(a) answering such a question, or
(b) complying with such an order, is not admissible in evidence against him or (unless they married or became civil partners after the making of the statement or admission) his spouse or civil partner.
(3) "Proceedings relating to property" means any proceedings for -
(a) the recovery or administration of any property,
(b) the execution of a trust, or
(c) an account of any property or dealings with property, and "property" means money or other property whether real or personal (including things in action and other intangible property).
(4) "Related offence" means -
(a) conspiracy to defraud;
(b) any other offence involving any form of fraudulent conduct or purpose.
This section is to the same effect as section 31(1) of the Theft Act 1968 which formerly applied to the offences repealed and replaced by the Fraud Act, save that it extends the ambit of the provision to conspiracy to defraud and other offences involving fraudulent conduct or purpose. The distinguishing feature of such other offences was held in Kensington International Ltd v. Congo[2008] 1 W.L.R. 1144, CA (Civ. Div.), to be that they involve some element of deception or, per Carnwath L.J., surreptitious dealing (deciding that bribery was such an offence). To come within subsection (3), the proceedings need not relate to the property which is the subject matter of the offence, and can include an action for recovery of a debt: ibid.
Fraud Act 2006, Sched. 2, para. 3
3. Abolition of deception offences
(1) Paragraph 1 of Schedule 1 [abolition of offences under Theft Act1968, ss.15, 15A, 16and 20(2), and Theft Act1978, ss.1and 2] does not affect any liability, investigation, legal proceeding or penalty for or in respect of any offence partly committed before the commencement of that paragraph.
(2) An offence is partly committed before the commencement of paragraph 1 of Schedule 1 if -
(a) a relevant event occurs before its commencement, and
(b) another relevant event occurs on or after its commencement.
(3) "Relevant event", in relation to an offence, means any act, omission or other event (including any result of one or more acts or omissions) proof of which is required for conviction of the offence.
As to the commencement date for paragraph 1 of Schedule 1, see post, 21-415. As to offences completed before the commencement date, see the Interpretation Act 1978, s.16 (Appendix B-16). These provisions do not restrict section 13 (ante) to questions which might incriminate a person of an offence committed after commencement of that section: Kensington International Ltd v. Congo ([2007] EWCA Civ 1128), ante.commentary021-415
Commencement - Section 15(1) provides that sections 1 (text) to 14 were to come into force on a day to be appointed. The appointed day was January 15, 2007: Fraud Act 2006 (Commencement) Order 2006 (S.I. 2006 No. 3200).
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